When states and individuals meet. The UN Ombudsperson as a ‘contact point’ between international and world society by Giumelli, Francesco & Costa Buranelli, Filippo
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When states and individuals meet. The UN Ombudsperson 
as a ‘contact point’ between international and  
world society 
 
F. Giumelli, F.C. Buranelli 
 
 
Date of deposit 10 07 2019 
Document version Author’s accepted manuscript 
Access rights © 2019, The Author(s). This work is made available online in 
accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author 
created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and 
may differ slightly from the final published version. 
Citation for 
published version 
Giumelli, F., Buranelli, F.C. (2019).  When states and individuals 
meet. The UN Ombudsperson as a ‘contact point’ between 
international and world society. International Relations, 
Accepted/In press. 
Link to published 
version 
https://journals.sagepub.com/home/ire 
 
Full metadata for this item is available in St Andrews Research 
Repository at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
1 
 
 
When states and individuals meet. The UN Ombudsperson as a ‘contact point’ between international 
and world society. 
  
Introduction 
In international politics it is now common to encounter loci where both states and individuals interact by 
enjoying legal and political rights. For instance, the Special Tribunals for the notorious conflicts in 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Former Yugoslavia as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
provide crucial examples of how the interaction between individuals and states has been formally 
institutionalized. One may notice how organizations such as the International Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce and the Permanent Court of Arbitration bring together interests, 
rights, and responsibilities of both states and non-state parties in the so-called ‘investor-state’ cases.1 In 
the same fashion the General Court, a ‘sub-court’ part of the European Court of Justice, allows ‘natural 
and legal persons’ to seek justice whenever there is reason to believe that their rights have been 
infringed by the European Union.2 Such synergies, mostly denied or neglected by neorealists or 
neoliberalists due to their state-centric ontological positions, have been captured in depth by strands of 
the literature on global governance and international organizations dealing specifically with instances of 
state and non-state intersections in world politics.3 Within the IR theory panorama, one would expect 
the English School of International Relations (henceforth ES) to have the theoretical and analytical tools 
to conceptualise and deal with such synergies between states and individuals better than other theories 
specifically thanks to its ‘ontological pluralism’ focusing on both states (international society) and 
individuals (world society).4 However, notwithstanding its vantage point as via media between realism 
and liberalism, the ES has not yet come up with proper theorization of these nexuses and synergies 
between the two domains despite its analytical potential to capture diachronically the nuances and 
underlying practices of a changing international order.5  
Thus, this paper asks how does the interaction between individuals and states take place in the ES? We 
argue that this interaction takes place via ‘contact points’, defined as those international bodies such as 
offices and tribunals (what in ES terms are called ‘secondary institutions’) that bring together states and 
non-states actors, be they individuals or groups, interacting on more equal grounds in terms of 1) 
responsibilities, and 2) rights towards each other. By ‘on more equal grounds’ we mean that within 
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contact points it is not taken for granted that states’ interests will prevail automatically due to power 
dynamics and hierarchical asymmetries, but rather than there is an interaction between states and 
individuals the outcome of which may be in favour of states as much as in favour of individuals. When 
the latter happens, states’ interests can prevail again only at higher political and reputational costs, as 
will be shown below. In this paper, the notion of ‘contact point’ is developed inductively by focusing on 
the Office of the Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee (hereinafter 
‘Ombudsperson’). The Ombudsperson is the quintessential trait d’union between individuals being 
targeted by sanctions and those states that asked the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to impose 
sanctions. The Ombudsperson is a typical case for the initial theoretical conceptualization of ‘contact 
points’. This international body operates with a dual set of rights and rules for states and individuals, 
complex actorness, and institutional autonomy or independence. Especially, the Ombudsperson 
operates in the realms of security for states and human rights for individuals, which exemplifies a typical 
interaction between them. To empirically illustrate the case of the Ombudsperson as an ‘contact point’, 
this piece of research makes use of the available secondary literature on world society and international 
sanctions, of legal documents and UN documentation accessible on the internet, and also benefits from 
an interview with Kimberly Prost, former Ombudsperson at the UN.  
This research has theoretical implications. We aim to refine, sharpen, and advance both the ES’s 
theoretical and analytical architecture. The contribution we seek to make is one that will better equip ES 
scholars to conceptualise and analyse those secondary institutions that allow states and individuals to 
enjoy rights and duties equally. By so doing, we will make possible for the ES to provide a more fine-
grained account for these synergies than other IR theories. As has been notably argued, ‘what is crucial 
… is not whether one begins with international society or world society but rather how a theoretical 
account incorporates both elements.’6 The notion of ‘contact point’ does set a new agenda for the ES 
since interactions between individuals and states are likely to become a constitutive essence of world 
politics. Without this conceptual innovation, we argue that the ES would be unable to understand 
current practices of international and world societies.  
The argument is divided into five sections. First, we delve into the ES literature on ‘world society’ and 
define it for the scope of this paper. In the second section, we conceptualize ‘contact points’ as an 
analytical tool and their relation to the concept of ‘institution’ in ES theory. Then, we summarize and 
present the evolution of targeted sanctions as intended by the Security Council. In the fourth section, 
we review the methods that were used by the Security Council to deal with legal challenges with a 
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specific focus on the Focal Point and, especially, the Ombudsperson. By so doing, we show the 
plausibility of the analytical tool of ‘contact points’ in terms of actors, rules and institutions. Finally, we 
present our conclusions and we suggest ways in which these findings can be further investigated.  
The English School and world society 
The ES has been at the centre of IR theories in the past decades.7 Its core essence revolves around the 
critique of the view of an international order being ruled by anarchy, by arguing that instead several 
norms, institutions, and rules discipline the relations among states. This set of norms, institutions, and 
rules would constitute an international society, rather than a pure international system,8 where anarchy 
would be governed by pure power politics á la Hobbes and Machiavelli. At the same time, since its very 
inception the ES had the intuition of contemplating the possibility that non-state actors would also 
determine the outcome of policy processes at the international level – in ES terms, the realm of non-
state actors has been called world society. Martin Wight referred to the three traditions in international 
relations – realism, rationalism and revolutionism9 – that have been associated with the tripartite 
conceptualization of international system, international society and world society.10 
In ES tradition, the role of individuals is key in a ‘world society’, but multiple ambiguities remained 
probably due to the lack of interest or attention paid to the importance (and analytical utility) of this 
term. As has been aptly argued, the category of world society has been treated as an analytical ‘dustbin’ 
and as a ‘Cinderella’, chronically undertheorized in the light of its alleged ‘revolutionist’ character which 
is not visible in contemporary world politics.11 As noted above, it is not accident that Wight refers to the 
term as a ‘revolutionist tradition’, as to say that a radical change in the international system would be 
necessary to move to a ‘world society’.12 The revolutionist tradition is understood by Wight as 
characterized by relations among individuals that are not mediated by states. Manning talks about a 
world society as ‘the nascent society of all mankind’,13 while Bull, instead, defined ‘world society’ as  
not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest 
and common values on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built. The concept of world society, in this 
sense, stands to the totality of global social interaction as our concept of international society stands to the concept of the 
international system.14 
Importantly, at the end of ‘The Anarchical Society’, Bull maintains against the revolutionist view that a 
world society is part of a ‘world political system’, or a ‘worldwide network of interaction’ among states 
and non-state actors,15 and this ‘in no way implies the demise of the state system’ since, historically, ‘the 
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states system has always operated within a wider system of political interaction’.16 A few years later, 
Buzan returned to this idea, arguing that world society in the ES should be used specifically to refer to a 
social structure where states, individuals and non-state actors are in play together and none of the three 
dominate over the other two.17 Yet, it has been recently said that in contemporary international 
relations ‘Buzan’s standard for world society, premised on equality between actors, is perhaps too 
exacting’.18  
In most recent years, the idea that world society has to be revolutionist has been challenged and 
alternative readings have been offered. For example, with a specific focus on international criminal law, 
Jason Ralph investigated the case of the ICC and concluded that the Rome Statute certainly contributes 
to the constitution of a world society. According to Ralph, a definition of ‘world society’ should be clear 
about its constitutive rules. The fact that both ‘international society’ and ‘world society’ share a 
‘common cosmopolitan consciousness based on humanity, as well as a common interest in seeing 
individuals punished for crimes that oﬀend humanity, has been generally accepted. The difference 
between the two societies, however, lies at the level of rules and institutions’.19 In terms of rules, the 
Rome statute ‘codiﬁes common interests, values, and institutions that are notionally independent of 
states’.20 In terms of institutions, the statute created the ICC, which is revolutionary to the extent that it 
allowed a prosecutor to launch an investigation based on evidence gathered by NGOs.21 In addition, one 
should notice that the ICC, as a permanent court, ‘can exercise jurisdiction without prior authorization 
either from states or from the Security Council. In this respect, the institution of criminal justice has 
been released from the rules of international society, and its sociological impact is no longer mediated 
by states. Criminal justice in other words is now an institution of world society’.22 Yet, he later argues 
that such world society cannot entirely be detached from a society of states: ‘The drafters of the Statute 
recognized the benefits of a world divided into nation-states, each acting as an agent of humanity, and 
the importance of comity between nation-states. In this respect, the organizing principle in this 
conception of world society is complementarity’.23 Given his interest in seeing how the ICC operates in a 
society of states, we see Ralph’s work as pioneering and complementing ours. However, one should 
remember that the main purpose of his book is that of showing how the Rome Statute ‘helps to 
constitute world society’24 rather than exploring the ICC as an institution shared by international and 
world society, and the synergies between the two. In other words, Ralph fails to notice that the ICC, 
rather than being an institution of world society, is in fact a ‘contact point’ between international and 
world society, as we aim to conceptualize in the next section. 
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In another recent treatment of world society, Ian Clark has defined the concept as follows: ‘The realm of 
the individual, of the non-official group or movement, and of the transnational network of 
nongovernmental agents’.25 In his work, he also does acknowledge that this realm is inextricably linked 
to that of sovereign states, and by showing how world society has conferred legitimacy to several 
institutions of international society over the centuries he develops this argument following from this 
assumption. Nonetheless, at a closer look, it seems that Clark’s work is more interested in the impact of 
world society over international society and in analytically defining the former, rather than exploring the 
intersections between the two.26 The same can be said for recent work produced by Costa Buranelli27 
and Stivachtis,28 who both look at how international society and world society impact on one another, 
rather than at their interaction(s) and shared practices.  
In his insightful contribution to debates over ‘world society’, Thomas Davies has recently argued that 
‘the institutions of international society and of world society cannot be understood in isolation from one 
another, but instead are often mutually dependent and in some cases – such as the market – the 
institutions are shared’.29 While he should be credited for this innovative assumption, which we fully 
share as will be evident in the paper, he is nonetheless more interested in demonstrating ‘how there are 
indeed institutions, rules, and norms […] in world society’, contrary to the common assumption that only 
international society can feature them.30 This has been recently echoed also by Matt Weinert who has 
argued in favour of a ‘spatialied reading’ of world society defined by discrete geographies within the 
framework of ‘cultural heritage,’ thus allowing for the identification of its primary and secondary 
institutions.31  
Thus, scholars of world society suggest that 1) whether referring to humanity in toto or some sectors of 
it, world society is based on a human, non-statist ontology; 2) while world society may well be 
analytically independent from international society, it is functionally linked to it through its own 
practices and institutions (and vice-versa); and 3) all authors seem to imply that the best exercise in 
terms of advancing ES research is to look at intersections between the two domains. Yet, albeit 
acknowledging them, they do not fully explore them.  
To be sure, ES scholars have indeed referred to the interaction between individuals and states in the 
international system, but not in a systematic and rigorous way. After all, already Martin Wight himself 
treated international system, international society and world society as being ‘not like three railroad 
tracks running parallel into infinity’, but rather as ‘streams […] sometimes interlacing’.32 Barry Buzan 
confirmed that ‘the three domains or type unit [what he calls interstate, interhuman and transnational 
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society] all are in play together’,33 but he also realized that unfortunately the ‘oppositional view of the 
relationship between international society and world society’ and the relationship between their 
components of order ‘has become rooted in ES thought, and serves to cut off the possibility of positive 
interaction’.34 
The theoretical locus where the ES explores interactions between international and world society at its 
deepest is the category of solidarism within international society. Solidarism, in ES theory, is a broad 
church. It can be understood either as ‘state-centric’ solidarism or as ‘cosmopolitan solidarism’.35 The 
former refers to ‘the possibility that states can collectively reach beyond a logic of coexistence’ to 
pursue joint gains or realize shared values,36 while the latter illustrates states’ disposition ‘to give moral 
primacy to “the great society of humankind”.’37 It is evident that in both (sub)definitions of solidarism, 
states are pivotal. As Buzan himself acknowledges, for solidarists ‘the great society of humankind may 
have force as a moral referent, but for the most part it lacks the agency to implement and defend 
universal rights. Only states, or secondary institutions largely under the control of states, can do that 
[…]’.38  In short, ‘while cosmopolitan logic is the main moral impetus for the solidarist camp, state-
centrism is the dominant practical theme’.39 Dunne40 seems to have lent his support to Buzan’s notion of 
state-centric solidarism, when he observes that ‘the development of world society institutions is 
dependent on the ideational and material support of core states in international society’.41 Yet, 
cosmopolitan solidarists are keener to emphasise the dual existence of rights and duties of states and 
individuals, and the independent authority or potential of international organizations to enforce or 
promote them.42 This is evident, for example, in the works of Lauterpacht, Bull, and Knudsen in regard to 
the collective enforcement of common principles (by means of international organization and 
international courts of justice), and the reservation of the use of force for the common good conceived 
as the basic organizational principles of international society.43 
According to cosmopolitan solidarists, principles and institutions associated with cosmopolitan 
solidarism are, ‘theoretically and empirically, also possible in contemporary international society, in 
spite of its ongoing pluralist bases’.44 After all, one of the virtues of the solidarist wing of the ES is that ‘it 
stresses the interconnectedness of international and world society and contributes to normative 
theorizing a progressive agenda’.45 But how is this interconnectedness played out? This is still terra 
incognita in the ES. In this respect, the key questions that solidarists still ask are ‘whether individuals can 
be subjects of rights and duties under international law in their own right and whether such rights and 
duties would be fundamentally at odds with pluralist international society’.46  
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The literature review above, in sum, shows that although there have been considerable efforts to 
distinguish international society from world society, the current debate on the ES has not fully explored 
the ‘grey area’ between them so that interactions between states and individuals on more even grounds 
fall outside of the theoretical framework. Placing institutions such as the ICC, the Special Tribunals, the 
European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Arbitrage under either (solidarist) 
international or world society would not be fully accurate as they are institutions created by states, but 
independent from them and that are mediating between rights and duties of states as well as of 
individuals/non-state actors. For this reason, we argue that the ES vocabulary should be enhanced with 
the concept of ‘contact points’.  
Contact points and the theorisation thereof 
Drawing on Wight’s conception of the three traditions constantly intertwining and crossing each other 
as outlined above, and on Kant’s notion of ‘complementarity’ when describing the ideal relationship 
between national, international and cosmopolitan law,47 we observe that a world society does not have 
to be ‘revolutionist’ to exist, but can coexist with an international society, enhancing and ‘expliciting’ its 
normative and moral content through its own practices and institutions.48 After all, in his major  
theoretical reworking of the ES, Buzan affirmed that thanks to his new tripartition based on inter-
state/inter-human/trans-national domains, ‘the key English School idea that the three traditions are 
understood to be simultaneously in play is preserved, but now on the grounds that social formations 
involving the three types of unit are always expected to be present in international systems to some 
degree.’49 Yet, the question is – how does this all hang together?50 We argue that these domains interact 
and overlap through specific and analytically discernible institutions, which we call ‘contact points’. 
‘Contact points’ are those international bodies, offices, and tribunals (‘secondary institutions’ in ES 
terms) where this synergy between the inter-state and inter-human domains is visible – loci where 
responsibilities and rights are possessed by states and individuals, too. Therefore, we argue that the 
notion of ‘contact points’ complements empirically the intellectual and analytical exercise of 
distinguishing between an international and a world society by keeping them analytically distinct while 
bringing them into a single, coherent analytical framework.  
In functional terms, a contact point facilitates and formalizes the interaction of states and individuals 
assigning equal rights and duties to both. According to our inductive logic, presented in the introduction, 
‘contact points’ can have several functions – for example, they can adjudicate, ensure equality, mediate. 
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In this paper, we show the operation of a contact point with respect to adjudication through the case of 
the Ombudsperson. Yet, it should be remembered that the theorization of contact points presented 
here is inductive and in its infancy, and we do not rule out other possible functions that may be 
performed by contact points. In sum, at the current stage of theorization, adjudication, mediation and 
insurance of equality are the functions, but not necessarily the only functions, of ‘contact points’. 
Why exactly do we talk about ‘contact points’? We argue that the idea of an ‘contact point’ well speaks 
to the several references made in the literature to the fact that international and world society interact, 
intertwine, and cross each other. They feature ‘contact’ because in these secondary institutions, the two 
societies meet each other and present both states and individuals with rights and duties. They are 
‘points’ because these secondary institutions are necessarily specific ‘segments,’ arenas, realms of two 
wider environments – that of international and world society, which can be detached in some occasions 
but can overlap in others. These instances are ‘contact points’. It is akin to mathematics, where two 
functions have the same value when they meet at a specific point, called appropriately ‘point of 
contact’. 
‘Contact points’ are distinguished by the presence of certain actors, rules and (formal) institutions. A 
‘contact point’ constitutes the locus for interactions between specific actors, namely individuals and 
states both enjoying a degree of agency in the policy process. The interactions among actors are 
disciplined by specific rules, namely by the existence of shared procedures, statutes and legal 
documents that assign both sets of actors’ rights and responsibilities. Finally, the abovementioned 
actors and rules are institutionalized, namely they are the product of durable and legitimate practices 
that are embodied in an international organization, body or specific sections/component of them (e.g. 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration or the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC). To sum up, according to our 
definition a formal institution that qualifies as a contact point is characterised by independent decision-
making processes, initiative, and jurisdiction, as well as complex actorness (viz. states and non-state 
actors).  
Given that we suggest that contact points are ‘institutionalized’ loci between international society and 
world society, it is inevitable that we engage with the concept of ‘institution’ within the ES. As is 
commonly known, the School has a sociological, quasi anthropological conceptualization of institutions, 
defined as rooted, durable but by no means eternal codified practices that channel and direct the 
behaviour of states (or, in general, actors), giving a sense of order and predictability to their actions.51 
They define the socio-structural context where actors operate, and who the legitimate actors are within 
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that context. Yet, the concept of institutions has been further sharpened by the distinction between 
primary and secondary institutions. The former refers to ‘institutions’ broadly characterised above, 
while the latter refers to international organizations and agencies related to them, akin to how 
neoliberal institutionalists speak of ‘regimes,’ or ‘organizations’.52 As noted above, it is this latter reading 
of institutions that we put at the core of our definition of ‘contact point’ – that of secondary 
institution.53 Yet, ES scholars may possibly take our framework further, revise it, and explore the 
possibility to have also primary institutions as potential ‘contact points’. Primary institutions such as the 
market or the environment, for example, have been described as authentically meeting human needs,54 
and recent scholarship on ‘hybrid institutions’ is currently being produced.55 After all, given that 
secondary institutions always emanate from primary ones, it may be argued that contact points qua 
secondary institutions are always linked to principles and norms underpinning some primary institutions 
and their derivatives. In this paper, for example, one may argue that the Ombudsperson as a contact 
point reflects the operation of the primary institution of human rights and its derivative of due process. 
This could potentially lead to a further analytical distinction – as there are primary and secondary 
institutions, so there can be primary and secondary contact points. While for the sake of brevity this will 
not be further investigated in the paper, we will return on this potential research development in the 
conclusions.  
Having clarified how we define contact points and their link to the ES theoretical toolkit, at this point 
one may ask – so what? We believe it is important to theorise contact points for the following reasons. 
First – the existence of ‘contact points’ signals that world politics is becoming more and more a complex 
realm, where states and individuals may in some instances enjoy less uneven rights and responsibilities. 
Second – the existence of ‘contact points’ signal, from a more theoretical perspective, that not only does 
a word society exist, but also that it is not necessarily detached from the society of states. Rather, 
‘contact points’ facilitate the complementarity of the two societies making international society less 
exclusionary by including people with their own rights and responsibilities in world politics. Third, and 
lastly – by introducing the concept of ‘contact point’ in the ES framework, one may actually use it as a 
proxy for the growing role of individuals in world politics. In other words, the more contact points exist 
in world politics, the more we witness the manifestation of a world society that, rather than being 
subordinate or in opposition to international society, is equal to it in terms of rights and duties of its 
constitutive actors. 
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Having provided an initial theorisation of ‘contact points’ in the ES, it is now time to start delving into an 
empirical analysis thereof. The remainder of the paper is a qualitative analysis of the case of the 
Ombudsperson with the analysis of primary and secondary sources as well as with interviews done with 
UN officials carried out in 2017. In order to respect the wish of the interviewees, their identity has been 
kept hidden unless differently authorised.  
The evolution of sanctions: from comprehensive to targeted 
The Security Council of the United Nations imposes sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Given 
that the UN is an association of states, sanctions were interpreted as being on states, which were the 
cases of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Iraq among others.56 In 1967, Galtung wrote that ‘with the 
present structure of the international system, territorial integrity makes [individual sanctions] – 
unilateral, multilateral or universal – impossible unless they are combined with a military presence’.57 
Former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali asked ‘whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in 
the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behaviour is 
unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects’58 and, by so doing, confirmed that the logic of 
sanctions still in the 1990s was to target economies to indirectly influence their leaders. It is no 
coincidence that, for instance, Milosevic was included in the sanctions list only once he was out of office 
in 2000, and Saddam Hussein was not sanctioned by the United Nations until 2003. However, currently, 
the UN imposes rarely sanctions on entire states and, instead, it has established the practice of 
sanctioning economic sectors and, especially, individuals and entities. This practice is known as targeted 
sanctions.59 Why did then the UN start to impose sanctions on individuals?  
The evolution of sanctions from their comprehensive nature to a targeted form that took place in the 
1990s is due mainly to three factors. First, international sanctions were thought to be ineffective to 
achieve political objective60 and, sometimes, they were strengthening their targets.61 Second, sanctions 
were affecting mostly civilians and innocent bystanders, so causing terrible humanitarian costs mainly 
on local populations.62 Sanctions was considered an important instrument for peace even by those who 
were criticizing it, such as Boutros-Ghali,63 but radical reforms were unlikely without innovations in the 
international system.  
This innovation, which is the third factor, is the emergence of the international individual responsibility 
norm in the second half of the 1990s. Affected by the tragedies of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the 
genocide in Rwanda and the protracted conflicts in Sierra Leone, the international community was 
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under pressure to provide a solution to situations that were intolerable in the new world order after the 
end of the Cold War. Parallel to these creations, the Rome Statute establishing the ICC represents the 
institutionalization of a norm that was observed only in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone,64 so 
creating a landmark decision to formalize the existence of an international individual responsibility.65  
The evolution of sanctions takes place in the same normative context. Initially, some argued that 
sanctions should be tailored to operate at the micro and intra-national level as well,66 therefore 
accepting to depart from a state-centred view of the past. Then, the Security Council established the 
practice of imposing sanctions on individuals. First, in response to the terrorist attacks against the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Security Council approved Resolution 1267 on 15 October 1999 
imposing sanctions on ‘the Afghan faction known as the Taliban’, thus unlinking the Taliban from the 
government of Afghanistan. Second, the Security Council passed Resolution 1333 (2000) adding Usama 
bin Laden, individuals and entities associated with him and with Al Qaida to the list of targets of the 
1267 committee.67  
Since then, the United Nations has adopted a targeted approach to sanctions68 with a special emphasis 
on individuals and non-state actors.69 Targeting individuals created a new set of problems that had not 
been anticipated. Especially in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, but even more as a general principle, 
names were added to the 1267 list without special care for human rights and due process 
considerations.70 Individual rights that were guaranteed at the national level in several UN members 
were under attack by the Security Council, which was made by the very same states. This double 
standard raised the tension between individuals and states that created a demand for institutions that 
would mediate and adjudicate disputes among them. These are the ‘contact points’ between an 
international society of states and world society of individuals we defined in the previous section. 
World society actors, rules and institutions: towards the emergence of ‘contact points’  
Complaints of individuals targeted with sanctions by the Security Council were originally directed at 
national Embassies and Permanent Representations at the UN, but they were not successful. Then, 
individuals turned to national and regional courts to have their case heard. Initially, courts stated that 
foreign policy fall outside their areas of competence, but the Kadi case in the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) reversed this approach. In 2003, a Saudi citizen named Mr Yassin Abdullah Kadi appealed against 
the EU Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 implementing UNSCR 1390 (2002) at the Court of First Instance 
(now the General Court) of the European Union.71 Although the EU limited itself to transpose a 
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Resolution of the Security Council, Kadi claimed that the decision to restrict his freedom taken by the EU 
was in violation of due process principles, which are both in international treaties and, especially, in EU 
law. When the first judgement was issued by the Court of First Instance in 2005, even if it allowed the 
listing to be maintained, the attention was brought to the fact that the Court actually reviewed the 
decision of the Security Council and stated that certain principles could not be violated by EU law even 
when implementing the decisions of the Security Council. The judgement was in favour of maintaining 
the name on the list, but Kadi appealed against the decision. In 2008, the ECJ agreed with Kadi and 
ordered the Council to annul the regulation unless steps were undertaken to meet acceptable due 
process standards. The ECJ established that individuals whose freedom and liberty are restricted by EU 
legislation should have guaranteed fundamental rights such as a due process and a fair trial, even if such 
decision implements the will of the Security Council. Individuals have the right to know the reasons that 
motivate such restriction, they have the right to be heard and they should have the instruments to 
remedy to mistakes made by the authority. Till then, these rights were recognized to individuals only de 
jure, so the novelty was that rights of this kind were de facto granted to individuals at an international 
level. This is relevant because whereas the direct targets of the decision were EU institutions, the 
indirect target was the UN and its Security Council. Concerned with the possibility to undermine the 
whole sanctions policy of the UN, the Security Council addressed these issues creating a new forum for 
interaction between individuals and international organizations. By doing so, it is shown how practices, 
actors, norms and institutions of an international society of states coexist with practices of a world 
society of individuals, which eventually cross in what we have defined as ‘contact points’.  
The first Kadi judgement by the Court of First Instance from 2005 was enough to raise awareness of the 
legal challenges that listing individuals would have created.72 Therefore, the Security Council decided to 
address the shortcomings of the listing process and established the Focal Point for De-listing with UNSCR 
1730 (2006), and subsequently amended by UNSCR 1735 (2006) and 1822 (2008). This new office was 
tasked to review de-listing requests from individuals listed by sanctions committee established by the 
Security Council with the exception of ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals. The Focal Point 
became as a trait d’union between individuals and member states of the Security Council. The 2005 
decision of the EU court pointed out that the listing process was in violation of several principles of due 
process, such as the right to be heard and effective remedy, so the Focal Point was an attempt to ensure 
that regional and national courts would not challenge the legality of the listings.73 The main innovation 
was to allow the Focal Point to receive requests directly from petitioners, while previously listed 
individuals could have done so only via their states of residence or citizenship. This need was highlighted 
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by the judgement of the Kadi case, which indicated that Kadi attempted to establish contact with the 
permanent representation of Saudi Arabia at the UN, but with no success.74 In general, the concern was 
that neither the state of origin nor the one of residence would have an interest to represent listed 
individuals, especially when listed precisely for alleged actions against their governments. On the one 
hand, stateless individuals could claim rights at the international level via the Focal Point, but on the 
other, the Security Council is still firmly in the drivers’ seat when it comes to making the final decision. In 
the 2008 Kadi judgement, the ECJ stated that the level of judicial review in place was not sufficient. As 
such, while the Focal Point departs from an international society of solely states, it lacks the level of 
formal institutionalization and regulatory framework to qualify as a ‘contact point’ as defined above. 
The next section shows how the creation of the Ombudsperson represents a departure from the Focal 
Point to qualify as a ‘secondary contact point’ between international and world society. 
The emergence of a new ‘secondary contact point’: The Ombudsperson 
The Focal Point is not responsible for the 1267 regime, which has been the first UN experience with 
extensive application of targeted sanctions. The 1267 regime is different from other sanctions regimes 
because targets had (as in the case of ‘the Afghan faction known as the Taliban’) and have (as in the case 
of members of Al-Qaida) weak state affiliations. It was often the case that states either did not show 
interest in individuals’ concerns, as occurred to Kadi, or they had an incentive not to represent 
individuals, such as the counter-terrorist listings as targets were considered dangerous for states as well. 
Thus, in the aftermath of the ECJ decision on Kadi, the Security Council established the Office of the 
Ombudsperson with UNSCR 1904 in 2009 in order to address the lack of judicial review of targeted 
sanctions.75 The role of liaison between stateless individuals and the designating member states is 
central to qualify the Office of the Ombudsperson as a ‘secondary contact point’ between international 
and world society, and to separate world society from cosmopolitan solidarism (which, as discussed 
above, relies on a statist ontology despite its human-centred goals).76 
The Office of the Ombudsperson receives the requests for de-listing of individuals who are listed under 
the 1267 regime and, since December 2015, members associated to ISIL/Da’esh.77 Originally, the list 
included also the Taliban faction, but a dedicated sanctions regime was created for the Taliban in 
2011.78 Similarly to the Focal Point, the Ombudsperson has a definite timeframe to conduct its review of 
delisting request as per Resolutions 2253 (2015), which revised UNSCR 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012) and 
2161 (2015). From July 2010 to July 2017, the Office of the Ombudsperson received 78 requests for 
delisting and it completed 74 of them. This activity resulted in ‘57 petitions being granted and 17 denied. 
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As a result […], 52 individuals and 28 entities have been delisted and one entity has been removed as an 
alias of a listed entity’.79 The Committee delisted three individuals before the Ombudsperson process 
and one petition was withdrawn.  
The Ombudsperson enhances and brings forward practices that were introduced by the Focal Point if we 
look at actors, rules and institutions of a world society. In terms of rules and actors, the Ombudsperson 
confirmed what had been already established by the Focal Point. When it comes to actors, states, 
individuals, and the Ombudsperson all enjoy a degree of agency in the process. First, states do play a 
central role because they decide who to target when imposing sanctions. Indeed, a former 
Ombudsperson suggested that under the current scheme it is highly unlikely that we will see individuals 
considered on equal grounds with states anytime soon, thus somehow reaffirming what argued above – 
that is, that contact points emanate from states and from their interests.80 However, once sanctions are 
imposed individuals can trigger the process that can eventually overturn a decision of the Security 
Council and can determine the behaviour of the Security Council in setting new standards for imposing 
sanctions, thus balancing states’ agency and exercising their right to quasi-judicial review.  
At the same time, this analysis suggests that, despite weaknesses and elements that are unique to this 
specific type of quasi-judicial review, the Ombudsperson enjoys a degree of independence from both 
states (international society) and petitioners (world society), which makes it qualitatively different from 
the Focal Point. As such, the Ombudsperson constitutes a ‘contact point’ between international and 
world society.  
First, the profile of the Ombudsperson ensures a certain degree of agency to the Office. According to 
resolution 1904, the Ombudsperson should be “an individual high moral character, impartiality and 
integrity with high qualifications and experience in relevant fields, such as legal, human rights, counter-
terrorism and sanctions”, and it should exercise its function in “an independent and impartial manner 
and shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any government”.81 This ‘requirement’ of 
independence is not necessary for the individual appointed as Focal Point for delisting. The outcome of 
the appointment of the Ombudsperson was the selection by the Secretary-General of individuals with 
very high international profiles: Kimberly Prost, formerly judge at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) from 2011 till 2015, Catherine Marchi-Uhel, formerly the Head of 
Chambers at the ICTY from 2015 till 2017, and Daniel Kipfer Fasciati since 18 July 2018, former President 
of the Federal Criminal Court of Switzerland.82  Although Prost and Marchi-Uhel had a clearly more 
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international profile, The appointees were qualified to make recommendations based on legal grounds 
rather than on political ones. 
Second, since 2011 the Ombudsperson does not share observations with the Security Council, but it 
recommends the Security Council to undertake certain actions, which empowered the Ombudsperson to 
tell the Security Council her/his view on the delisting requests instead of providing a vague overview of 
the legal conditions attached to the case of the petitioner.83 While the Focal point provides more of a 
forum to exchange views between the petitioners (i.e. individuals and entities) and the reviewing states, 
the Ombudsperson can directly influence the decisions of the Security Council by providing independent 
assessments and recommendations on specific actions to be undertaken.  
Third, while the Focal Point could only acquire information from member states, the Ombudsperson can 
operate independently from them. In many cases ’substantial independent research’ would be carried 
out, which included interviewing journalists, authors and, in a case, also the producers of a 
documentary.84 This means that while the Office of the Ombudsperson does not approximate the 
powers of criminal prosecutions in domestic legal systems, Kimberly Prost suggested that she acted 
more like an investigative judge in civil law systems.85  
Fourth, the Office of the Ombudsperson is not within the Security Council and/or the Secretariat. While 
the Focal Point is established within the Secretariat and it is dedicated to receive de-listing requests and 
to communicate it to the member states, the Ombudsperson is not within the Secretariat and it should 
act ‘in an independent and impartial manner and shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any 
government’.86 Diversely from the Focal Point, the Ombudsperson has a semi-independent budget and it 
is explicitly mandated to be independent from member states (i.e. the Security Council) and the 
Secretariat. 
Fifth, the reverse consensus procedure gives the Ombudsperson a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the states. Since 2011, if the Ombudsperson recommends de-listing, then the Sanctions Committee can 
retain the listing only by consensus. If it is true that the Sanctions Committee can always decide to refer 
the matter to the Security Council, where the regular procedure would apply, it is also true that this has 
never happened and the Committee has never turned down a recommendation of the Ombudsperson 
to date. It is clear that the reverse consensus mechanism empowers the Ombudsperson vis-à-vis the 
Security Council and we are not aware of other cases where this principle was established. Reverse 
consensus formalizes a classical mechanism of power separation, wherein powers are interdependent 
16 
 
and they control each other. Ultimately, states hold the last say, but a super majority is needed to 
overturn a recommendation from the Ombudsperson.  
Finally, the Ombudsperson acted independently from the Security Council. This occurred because the 
Ombudsperson succeeded in building trust with both member states and petitioners by meeting and 
continually dialoguing with them. However, the meetings did not affect the independence of the 
Ombudsperson precisely because she would meet with all the parties. This dynamism cemented the 
authority of the Office, so that its recommendations were never challenged by the Council, and 
petitioners trusted the Office in doing the review. Using the words of the former Ombudsperson, ‘The 
system works because states trusted the person in the position, both me and my successor’.87 From 
exercising ‘limited independence’ at the beginning, the Ombudsperson moved towards ‘assertive 
independence’ to establish legal standards for listing and de-listing procedures. 
The Office of the Ombudsperson is theoretically comparable to the judiciary system in a separation of 
power framework because it is independent, yet interdependent with the Security Council. For instance, 
the UNSC can, eventually, reverse the recommendations of the Ombudsperson. However, confronting 
the Ombudsperson would entail high political costs for the UNSC, because it would be held liable for 
violating human rights of listed individuals. This balance, de facto, restrains the power of the UNSC as in 
line with the principles of the separation of power framework. However, de jure, the Security Council 
can decide to reassert its authority over the Ombudsperson. First, the mandate of the Office is renewed 
periodically, therefore the Security Council could theoretically decide not to have the Office any longer. 
Second, the high rate of acceptance of Ombudsperson’s recommendations could suggest that member 
states and the Ombudsperson tend to share objectives rather than balancing each other. Third, 
resources made available to the Office is still strongly linked to the wishes of the Security Council. 
Without financial independence, the independence of the Ombudsperson could be more fragile than it 
has appeared so far. Finally, it is the Security Council that appoints the Ombudsperson and this aspect 
could affect the functioning of the Office. For instance, the position remained vacant for eleven months 
from August 2017 till July 2018 and this delay could be explained either by need of the Security Council 
to reassert its centrality in the selection procedure or by disagreements emerged in the selection 
procedures. The matter has been treated confidentially by the Security Council and it is too early to find 
reliable information on this matter.  
Conclusions 
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By relying on the evolution of the sanction policy of the UN, from comprehensive to targeted, and on 
the two innovations of the Focal Point and the Ombudsperson, the paper has made the case for focusing 
on the intersection between world and international society, rather than on perpetuating pure 
analytical studies concerned solely with precise definitions of the former. The Ombudsperson example 
shows that the international society framework is not sufficient to understand what happens in the 
realm of targeted sanctions. On the one hand, individuals play a determinant role in the process and, on 
the other, the practices associated to the Office and the role that states still play are also an indication 
that we do not yet live in a revolutionist world society of individuals á la Wight. If anything, they are 
symptoms of a tension ‘between a potentially radical ontological re-characterization of world society as 
a society of humans and a desire to identify rules and practices that would make possible an adaptation 
of the dominant international society’.88 Thus, the concept of ‘contact point’ that we have introduced is 
an important theoretical and analytical innovation that allows to make sense of the evolution of the 
targeted sanctions world where specific actors, rules and institutions that belong to the human domain 
(rather than to that of states) represent a gradual but steady integration of elements of world society 
into an international society, in line with those authors who see coexistence between the two, as 
discussed in the literature review above.  
Overall, this article enhances the ES and it places it at the forefront of IR theories for understanding 
international political dynamics. Contrary to other realist and liberal theories, the ES elevates individuals 
to being full actors of international politics. Differently from other approaches, the ES conceives that 
states and individuals can and indeed do coexist and interact with each other on more equal grounds. 
The concept of ‘contact point’ crystallises this relation placing the ES among the few theories that offers 
analytical instruments to read the evolution of international politics in the twenty-first century.   
The introduction of the ‘contact point’ as instances where responsibilities and rights are possessed by 
states and individuals bears empirical and analytical implications, which set the path for new avenues of 
research. For example, new empirical research may also be done especially in regard to the search for 
more ‘contact points’ in international politics with efforts to classify them according to procedures, 
jurisdiction and strength of such organizations/bodies. At the same time, this paper may encourage new 
analytical research, too.  While through the case study on the Ombudsperson we have focused on a 
formal (secondary) institution and while we mentioned other formal institutions such as the 
International Court of Arbitration, the Permanent Court of Arbitration and, possibly, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union as additional examples of contact points, nothing prevents other scholars to 
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theorise contact points in the form of ‘primary institutions’ by amending and revising the initial 
framework provided in this paper. As noted above, the market, human rights, and environmentalism 
may well lend themselves to be defined as ‘primary contact points’, i.e. as those primary institutions 
that put together international and world society. In sum, we do hope that this first study on ‘contact 
points’ will encourage other scholars to contribute to their further theorisation as well as to produce 
more analytical and empirical research on them by building on the conceptual work we have done in 
this paper. 
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